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Concentrated poverty has been said to impose a double burden on those that con-
front it. In addition to an individual’s own ﬁ  nancial constraints, institutions and 
social networks of poor neighborhoods can further limit access to quality ser-
vices and resources for those that live there. This study contributes to the charac-
terization of the relationship between subprime lending and poor neighborhoods 
by including a spatial dimension to the analysis, in an attempt to capture social 
effect differences in poor and less poor neighborhoods. The analysis is applied 
to 2004-2006 census tract level data in Cuyahoga County, home to Cleveland, 
Ohio, a region that features urban neighborhoods highly segregated by income 
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Concentrated poverty has been said to impose a double burden on those that
confront it. One's own nancial constraints may prevent or reduce access to
good education, health, and nancial services as well as good jobs. In addi-
tion, institutions and social networks of poor neighborhoods can further limit
access to quality services and resources for those that live there. Less than
four decades ago the institutional practice of redlining limited access to credit
in poor neighborhoods. Redlining was a term to denote banks' unwillingness
to lend to individuals based on where they lived and regardless of their own
creditworthiness. Low income neighborhoods were red lined on a map sig-
naling boundaries to the issuance of credit in these areas. During the 1970's,
fair lending legislation was enacted to revert discriminatory practices and
ensure fair and impartial access to credit [2]. With the recent expansion of
mortgage credit and securitization, the relationship between neighborhood
poverty and access to credit changed dramatically. Poorer neighborhoods
throughout the nation, that during the redlining days would have had little
to no credit availability, experienced a large drop in mortgage application de-
nial rates and an expansion of subprime credit from 2002-2005, in the midst
of relative income and employment declines1 [7]. As was the case during
the redlining era, these neighborhoods have been negatively impacted by the
distinct borrowing and lending patterns they experienced. However, unlike
the pre-70's case, characterizing the relationship between borrowing/lending
and neighborhood poverty is more challenging than displaying evidence of
red-lined maps. Calem, Hersha, and Wachter [3] identify a positive rela-
tionship between high rates of subprime lending and characteristics of low
1Mian and Su [7] quantify this credit expansion paired with relative income and em-
ployment decline for what they call subprime zip codes. They dene zip codes as subprime
(prime) if their share of low-credit score consumers (FICO score below 660 as of 1991) is in
the highest (lowest) quartile, within their respective county. Subprime zip codes, in com-
parison to prime ones, have lower median income, higher poverty rates, lower education
levels, higher unemployment rates and a large fraction of minority population.
2income neighborhoods in seven cities between 2002 and 2007. They point to
the share of neighborhood minority and low educational level as consistently
and negatively related to higher subprime shares, even when controlling for
credit and equity risk. Squires, Hyra, and Renner [11] nd that the level
of racial segregation at the metropolitan level is positively related with the
rate of subprime lending in 2006, even after controlling for percent minority,
low credit scores, poverty, and median home value. They also suggest that
general education levels seem to be an important protective factor against
high rates of subprime lending. A qualitative study by Pittman [9] uses in-
depth interviews to inquire why black borrowers tend to disproportionately
hold higher priced mortgage products even when controlling for creditwor-
thiness. Her work suggests borrowers' decisions were shaped by the informal
and formal advice they received, and that social networks may be at play in
determining dierent outcomes between borrowers.
This study contributes to the characterization of the relationship between
subprime lending and poor neighborhoods by adding a spatial dimension to
the analysis, in an attempt to capture social eect dierences in poor and less
poor neighborhoods. The focus is on non-depository subprime lending taking
place in Cuyahoga County, home to Cleveland, Ohio during the 2004-2006
period. The region features a mix of neighborhoods, ranging from highly
segregated and persistently poor, to those of mid to high income and racially
diverse2. Non-depository subprime loans are subprime loans according to
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data that were issued by an inde-
pendent mortgage company or a subsidiary of a bank, and likely facilitated
by a mortgage broker. A 2004 Government Accounting Oce report on con-
sumer protection [12] concludes that much of the predatory lending problem
lies with non-depository nance companies and that homebuyer education,
2In fact, a study by Sethi and Somanathan rank Cleveland third out of thirty ma-
jor metropolitan areas in terms of a racial dissimilarity index that accounts for income
dierences [10].
3counseling, and disclosures have limited eectiveness in deterring predatory
lending.
The paper proceeds by outlining a set of social and non-social hypotheses
that may explain the spatial relationship between non-depository subprime
lending and neighborhood poverty.3 This is followed by the models and data
section, which includes a discussion of issues and limitations encountered
when working with aggregate data and the lack of social network data. Re-
sults are then presented followed by concluding remarks.
2 Neighborhood Poverty and Subprime Lend-
ing
People are connected to others through social links. These can originate
in the family, neighborhood, work environment, or through their sense of
aliation to groups with common beliefs, ethnicity, status, etc. Since the
poverty status of individuals is likely to in
uence social ties formation, the
in
uence of social environments on individual decisions and group outcomes
may dier among poor and non-poor groups. Over the past three decades,
social science researchers have developed concepts and models to formally
explore the eects of social interactions on individual behavior and outcomes.
Manski's [6] non-exclusive hypotheses for why one might observe individuals
in the same social environment behaving similarly have become standard
and are used here to describe various hypotheses underlying the relationship
between subprime lending rates and neighborhood poverty.
 Correlated eects (non-social): individuals in the same group tend to
display similar borrowing outcomes because they have similar individ-
ual characteristics or face similar institutional environments. Income
3In what follows, 'subprime lending' will be used to refer to non-depository subprime
lending.
4and credit scores are examples of such characteristics. An individual's
low credit scores and savings are likely to reduce access to prime prod-
ucts. Lack of access to good education is an institutional constraint
likely to make for less sophisticated borrowers. These characteristics,
more prevalent among the poor, may explain in part why similar bor-
rowing/lending patterns are observed in poor neighborhoods.
 Exogenous or contextual interactions (social): the propensity of an
individual to take out a subprime loan varies with the exogenous char-
acteristics of the group. Independent of a particular borrower's income
or education level, by living in a poor neighborhood (group income is
low) he may likely have been more exposed to location or group-based
marketing of subprime products. Visual ads in convenience stores, sales
presentations by mortgage brokers in social gatherings are examples of
contextual eects inducing similar borrowing behaviors.
 Endogenous interactions (social): all else equal, the propensity of an
individual to take out a subprime loan varies with the borrowing be-
havior of the group. As peers make use of these mortgage products
with seemingly positive results (in the short term), risk aversion to-
ward these previously unfamiliar products drops, possibly inducing an
increased demand4. A lower reliance on mainstream nancial institu-
tions by low income individuals may have contributed to strengthen
this eect. Unlike the two previous types of eects, these interactions
induce what is called a social multiplier eect. Assume persons 'J' and
'I' are socially linked. If person 'J' displays low risk aversion to a mort-
gage product, person 'I' may lower her own risk aversion to it. This in
turn induces person's 'J' risk aversion to further decrease. Anecdotal
evidence pointing to referrals as a way to broker high cost loans in poor
4Note that no matter how rich the data, risk aversion will be unobservable to the
researcher.
5neighborhoods illustrates a channel for the formation of endogenous in-
teractions.
Thus, poverty may exert its in
uence on the propensity to take out a sub-
prime loan through individual or social group eects. And as is evident now,
high rates of subprime lending in poor neighborhoods have led to high foreclo-
sure rates, devastation and wealth loss for borrowers and non-borrowers alike.
Correlated individual eects, as well as social -exogenous and endogenous-
eects may be apparent in poor neighborhoods. The individual eects are
due to being poor whereas the social eects are directly related to living in a
poor neighborhood, and speak of what has been termed the `double burden'
of concentrated poverty.
Ideally one would want to know in what ways did the concentration of
poverty in
uence the high rates of subprime lending that these neighborhoods
experienced. Is the decision or propensity of a person to take-up a subprime
loan directly aected by the lending decisions of his peers in that respect?
Are endogenous eects at play? That is, even after accounting for character-
istics of the borrower and the people in his social network - such as income,
education, credit scores - as well as neighborhood characteristics, do lending
decisions of the latter aect those of the former? Unable to answer that, a
less specic question is to ask whether social eects in general, a combination
of endogenous and exogenous eects, induced higher rates of subprime lend-
ing. And whether lending in lower income neighborhoods exhibit stronger or
weaker social interaction eects than in less poor areas. Is there any evidence
that social interactions in poor neighborhoods facilitated the higher rates of
subprime lending? If evidence exists, it provides important feedback that can
serve to inform nancial education eorts and consumer protection policies.
It would also suggest revisiting the availability and accessibility of products in
the traditional nancial system that meet the needs of low income borrowers.
63 Models and Data
Much of the research on social interactions has focused on being able to iden-
tify endogenous eects when present, given that policy implementation may
benet from recognizing social multiplier eects. A typical example is to
consider the eects of additional tutoring to a group of students in a class-
room. Assume students are homogeneous in terms of family income, parental
education, health, and other relevant exogenous factors, and education qual-
ity per student remains xed. If in fact, there are endogenous interaction
eects on student achievement, increased achievement by the tutored group
would increase the achievement of the overall group and in turn, further in-
crease the tutored group's achievement. Given the limitations of the data at
hand, this study makes no attempt to isolate a social multiplier eect in sub-
prime borrowing. Even if disaggregate or individual level data were available
along with their respective social links, lack of data on unobservables such as
risk aversion will prevent obtaining accurate estimates of social interaction
eects. Cooley [4] shows this to be the case for student achievement peer
eects, when peer achievement is proxying for unobservable eort.
The lack of social network data aects the analysis, whether it is per-
formed at the aggregate or disaggregate level. Consider the case in which
disaggregate or individual level data are available. When loans are renances,
location of the home allows linking a borrower with a geographic area such
as the census tract5 in which the home is located. Yet, it misses links taking
place in other social spaces not related to the neighborhood. When loans
are for a new home, location of the new home is not necessarily close to the
borrower's previous neighborhood. Given the lack of specicity in the data,
including a rather large geographic denition of neighborhood should be pre-
5Census tracts are small statistical subdivisions of a county, and are designed to be
homogeneous in terms of population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions.
There are 495 census tracts in Cuyahoga County.
7ferred to a small one.6
In this section a spatial analysis is performed on rates of subprime lending
and other characteristics at the census tract level. Since the analysis is done
at the aggregate level, it is not able to identify a social interactions eect.
However, the spatial patterns found in poor neighborhoods are consistent
with stronger social interaction eects inducing subprime lending in compar-
ison to less poor neighborhoods.
Assume disaggregate or borrower level data were available, including data
on the social network of borrowers. A simple model of spatial interactions
would be the following:
y = Wdy + e; (1)
with y being the observed individual's decision or propensity to take out a
subprime loan, Wd a disaggregate spatial weights matrix with information of
each individual's neighbors, and e a disturbance term. Then  is the spatial
interaction parameter between peer and borrower decisions. If this model is
extended to include a set of explanatory variables and its spatial lags, then
even endogenous social interaction eects may be captured by the spatial pa-
rameter . However, aggregating the data to the neighborhood level imposes
strong restrictions on the interpretation of  as a social interaction parame-
ter. The following procedure helps interpret the spatial interaction parameter
under aggregation. Assume m neighborhoods, each of size ni, i = 1; ;m,
P
ni = N. Pre-multiplying both sides of the disaggregate equation (1) by
an averaging matrix AmN =
6As will be detailed in the following sections, the model is estimated with data on
home purchases, renances and home improvement loans, as well as for renances and
home improvement loans only.
82











. . . ... . . .





7 7 7 7
5
one obtains (2), which diers from the aggregate data model in equation
(3). In words, the aggregate data model is not the same as the disaggregate
model pre-multiplied by an aggregation matrix, and thus, spatial interaction
parameters  and ~  will not be comparable in general.
Ay = AWdy + Ae; (2)
Ay = ~ WaAy + Ae; (3)
However, if Wd and Wa are such that
AWdy = WaAy; (4)
then  = ~ , so the spatial interaction parameters of both models are equal.
The following row-standardized spatial contiguity matrices, Wd := [diag(  Wd1N)] 1  Wd
and Wa := A  WdA0 satisfy condition (4), where
 Wd =
2
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dij; number of neighborhoods contiguous to i
Here, Wa is the row-standardized spatial -neighborhood- contiguity matrix
that would be used for the aggregated data model. But Wd, is not a typical
spatial weights matrix for the disaggregate model. While it accounts for spa-
tial contiguity between individuals in contiguous neighborhoods, it fails to
capture within neighborhood spatial contiguity. Thus, the aggregate model
will not be able to identify within neighborhood spatial interactions through
the spatial parameter , but does need to account for it with the use of other
explanatory variables to reduce misspecication bias in . If model (3) is
extended by introducing a set of relevant aggregated borrower and neighbor-
hood characteristics, as well as their spatial lags in the right hand side, then
 should still be able to capture spatial eects in subprime lending due to
endogenous and contextual social interactions taking place across neighbor-
hoods.
In order to explore dierences in lending patterns among poorer and less
poor neighborhoods (census tracts for this analysis), these are classied into
two categories according to the percentage of poor inhabitants. And with
a dual-regime spatial model a spatial interaction parameter is estimated for
10each category, i.e., poorer (p) and less poor (np) neighborhoods. Models
including spatially lagged dependent and independent variables are called
Durbin models, so the following dual-regime spatial Durbin model with time
xed eects is estimated:
Y = pPWY + np(I   P)WY + P1mT + X + WX + T 
 1m +  (5)
where Y = [y11; ;ym1; ;ymT]0 is the stacked vector of y0
its, the subprime
lending rate in census tract i during year t. The data includes all tracts in
Cuyahoga County, Ohio with more than 16 originations each year over the
2004-2006 period (T = 3), according to HMDA data. W = IT 
 Wa, with
Wa being a row-standardized spatial weights matrix for the census tract level
data. Year xed eects are represented by T and  is an iid error term.
P = IT 
 diag(pi), with pi being a dummy for poverty in census tract i.
Tracts are classied into the poorer group if z% of its population is below
the ocial poverty line, according to the 2000 Census. Figure 1 shows the
distribution of poverty rates in Cuyahoga County neighborhoods according
to the 2000 Census. The model is estimated for z values of 20, 30, and 40
percent. Columns of X are yearly census tract data on credit scores and
borrower income, as well as time-invariant data on race, and education from
the Census. More specically, explanatory variables are as follows. Data
on the percent of the tract population with low credit scores are based on
Equifax and Transunion scores.7 Median borrower income from HMDA is
7The low credit score upper bound is an equivalent to a 600 FICO score. This corre-
sponds to 490 for Transunion and 640 for Equifax. Equifax based rates are available for
2005 and 2006 while Transunion based rates are for 2004 and 2005. The 2004-2005 change
in the percent of population with low credit scores from Transunion is applied to the 2005
Equifax based gure to obtain a 2004 estimate. That is ^ E2004 = E2005T2004=T2005, where
Et is the percent of population in the tract with low credit score in year t based on Equifax
11another time varying explanatory variable. Time xed eects are important
given the national trends in credit expansion and securitization taking place
during the 2004-2006 period. Explanatory variables at the tract level that
do not vary with time are the percent of the population without high school
diploma, and the percent of African American population, both from the
Census 2000. Finally, the spatial lags of these variables (WX) are also in-
cluded, making it a spatial Durbin model. Elhorst [5] suggests using this
model in the presence of endogenous, exogenous, and correlated eects. He
argues that a Durbin model is more likely to produce unbiased coecient
estimates even if the true data generating process is a spatial lag, spatial
error, or a combination of them.
Characteristics measured in X aect lending and borrowing at the indi-
vidual and neighborhood level, so the parameters in  clearly confound the
individual and contextual eects of these variables in the aggregate model.8
Parameters in  control for additional contextual eects taking place across
adjacent neighborhoods. Parameters in T control for correlated eects not
explicitly entered in the model. With these controls in place, it is of interest
to see whether spatial interactions (WY ) have a positive and larger impact
in poor neighborhoods as opposed to less poor ones, even after accounting
for within and across neighborhood characteristics, and exogenous factors
correlated with borrowing and lending patterns (X, WX, and time xed
eects). Such ndings would be consistent with stronger social interaction
eects on subprime lending operating in poorer neighborhoods. Even when
data, and Tt is the corresponding measure based on Transunion data. The variables used
in the model are ^ E2004, E2005, and E2006.
8In other words, income may capture individual and contextual eects of neighbor-
hood income on subprime rates: individual characteristics, such as low income, may limit
the borrower to qualifying for products that she can -at least initially- aord, such as
ones with no down payment or a low teaser rate. Additionally, lenders and brokers may
have marketed their subprime products in low income neighborhoods, attracting clients
regardless of their income (a contextual eect).
12no direct inferences from the model can be made at the borrower level, this
analysis adds to the understanding of the consumer credit market in areas of
concentrated poverty.
The model is estimated via maximum likelihood both, for raw rates (lin-
ear probability model) and for the log odds ratio of subprime lending.9 The
advantage of estimating with the log odds transformed data (besides avoiding
predicted rates outside the (0;1) range) is that their distribution is closer to
normality, an assumption of maximum likelihood estimation. As expected,
the Jarque-Bera test rejects the null hypothesis of normality for the raw,
but not the transformed data. On the other hand, the advantage of the
linear probability model is that interpretation and comparison of parame-
ter estimates are straightforward. Thus we present the results for the linear
probability model only, since models lead to the same overall results (esti-
mations under both specications are consistent in terms of parameter signs
and signicance for the exogenous and spatially lagged dependent variables).
Figure 2 shows the distribution of subprime lending in census tracts in
the three year period, for various slices of the data according the mentioned
poverty levels. Clearly, most of the higher rates are in the tracts with poverty
levels between 20% and 40%. The maps in gure 3 provide a clear picture of
the spread of subprime lending that took place in the 2004-2006 period.
4 Results
The main model is estimated with 2004-2006 HMDA loan data for home pur-
chases, renances and home improvement, for 1-4 family units, and secured
by rst lien. A restricted model for renances and home improvement loans
only is also estimated. The advantage of restricting the data to renances
9Maximum likelihood estimation of the model is performed using a Matlab routine pro-
vided by P. Elhorst and available on his website http://www.regroningen.nl/elhorst/
software.shtml












Cuyahoga County census tracts, Census 2000
Figure 1: Distribution of % population below poverty line
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Figure 2: Relative frequency histograms of non-depository subprime lending
rates by % population below poverty line
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Figure 3: Non-depository subprime lending rates in Cuyahoga County, OH -
2004 and 2006
15and home improvement loans is that borrowers' neighborhood location is
more likely to be that of the mortgaged property (recorded in HMDA) at the
time the decision to take out a loan is being made. However, social inter-
actions between borrowers renancing a mortgage and those buying a home
may also induce subprime activity, and these interactions would not be cap-
tured by the spatial parameters of the restricted model. This is a signicant
disadvantage of the restricted model. Table 1 shows that on average, about
half of all loans in the dataset are renance or home improvement loans. It
is also clear that the share of home purchase loans increased year by year
throughout this period. For the model including all loan types, tracts with
less than 16 loans on a given year are excluded from the analysis. With this
condition, the main model is estimated on 422 tracts, excluding mainly the
downtown, industrial, and predominantly rental areas. The restricted model
is estimated on 408 tracts, including only those with more than 8 loans on
any given year.
Table 1: Number of Loans by Census Tract - Descriptive Statistics
All loans Re, HI only Ratio Re/All
year 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006
tracts 487 486 486 483 475 476 483 475 476
p10 18 17 12 10 11 7 0.46 0.40 0.34
p25 51 49 36 30 26 18 0.52 0.47 0.39
p50 93 87 68 56 46 32 0.58 0.52 0.47
p75 146 133 102 83 69 46 0.64 0.58 0.54
p90 188 176 138 105 92 62 0.71 0.65 0.60
p100 407 492 295 219 206 142 1.00 1.00 1.00
mean 101.93 95.23 72.22 58.72 49.98 33.63 0.58 0.52 0.47
stdev 68.16 64.28 48.59 37.29 31.85 21.46 0.12 0.11 0.13
16Table 2 displays estimated parameters for the main model. Poverty
thresholds z are set at 20, 30 and 40 percent. Thus, tracts are classied
into the `poorer' group if z% of its population falls below the poverty line.
When the threshold is set at 20 percent, the rate of non-depository subprime
lending taking place in the poorer tracts (those with more than a 20% poverty
rate) is signicantly higher than that in the less poor tracts. However the sta-
tistical signicance of the parameter Pz fades when the threshold is moved
to 30 and above percent poverty, that is, when comparing tracts with more
than a 30% poverty rate to those with 30% or lower poverty rate, and con-
trolling for all model variables. This eect also holds for the re only model
3. For all models, higher subprime rates are signicantly related to a higher
percent of tract population with low credit score and no high school diploma,
as well as with lower medium borrower income. Even after accounting for all
these eects, the percent of African Americans in the tract is positively and
signicantly related to higher rates of non-depository subprime lending for
all models.
The coecients for the spatial lags of the exogenous variables (slags) are
for the most part statistically insignicant. Coecient signs for this set of
variables suggest a competitive-type relationship taking place across neigh-
boring tracts. Once tract characteristics are accounted for, the same char-
acteristics that result in higher rates of subprime lending for the tract are
associated with lower subprime lending rates in neighboring tracts. Negative
spatial correlation patterns across geographies arise in models of regional
investment, for instance. Brown, Florax, and McNamara [1] nd that re-
gional characteristics such as market structure, labor supply, infrastructure,
among others, attract investment opportunities to the region and away from
its neighbors. Similarly, one could argue that tracts with higher rates of sub-
prime borrowers (low credit scores, low income and education levels) were
attractors of subprime business, although no attempt to test this hypothe-
17sis is made here. However, according to Pace and LeSage [8], including the
spatial lags of the exogenous variables may diminish omitted variable bias
when the data generating process is characterized by spatial dependence in
the endogenous, exogenous, and residual terms.
The focus is on seeing whether there are dierences in spatial interaction
eects in subprime lending in poor as compared to less poor areas, once rele-
vant exogenous factors and their spatial lags are taken into account. And this
is in fact the case for both models, suggesting that endogenous or contextual
social interactions play a smaller role in subprime lending in less poor versus
poorer neighborhoods. Model estimates of np and p are denoted by slag y<z
and slag yz respectively in tables 2 and 3. Estimates of spatial eects are
both positive, with statistically larger spatial eects taking place in poorer
neighborhoods, irregardless of the poverty benchmark. For the 20% bench-
mark, according to the main model (all loans), spatial interactions across
poorer neighborhoods add about half a percentage point of non-depository
high cost lending, as compared to less than a third point in less poor areas.
5 Conclusions
It may not come as a surprise that poorer neighborhoods in Cuyahoga, those
with at least 20% of its population falling below the poverty line, experi-
enced higher rates of subprime lending facilitated by mortgage brokers, as
compared to less poor neighborhoods. But given that the region features ur-
ban neighborhoods highly segregated by income and race, it is of interest to
further understand the eects of concentrated poverty on subprime lending.
This study contributes to the characterization of the relationship between
subprime lending and poor neighborhoods by adding a spatial dimension to
the analysis, in an attempt to capture social eect dierences in poorer as
18compared to less poor neighborhoods. After controlling for other relevant
factors, the model nds stronger spatial interactions for poorer neighbor-
hoods, suggesting that social eects related to poverty may have facilitated
the higher rates of subprime lending. It is important to note that social
eects can results from demand and supply side events. On the demand
side, borrowers may have become less risk averse to subprime mortgages, as
their peers purchased these products with seemingly positive results. On the
supply side, borrowers living in a poorer neighborhood may have been more
exposed to the marketing of these products. While the analysis is not able
to separate between these two social hypotheses, they can both be traced
to the eects of living in poor neighborhoods. This nding should provide
important feedback to those involved in nancial education eorts and con-
sumer protection, and suggests revisiting the availability of products in the
traditional nancial system that meet the needs of low income borrowers.
19Table 2: Two-Regime Spatial Durbin Models for Various Poverty Thresholds - Purchase and Re Loans
Dependent variable y: Non-depository high cost lending rate
Poverty threshold (z)
% poor population in tract 20% 30% 40%
Variable Coecient t-stat z-prob. Coecient t-stat z-prob. Coecient t-stat z-prob.
Pz 0.029 3.200 0.001 0.002 0.189 0.850 0.006 0.328 0.743
% lowcred 0.400 10.736 0.000 0.404 10.662 0.000 0.399 10.503 0.000
% afamerican 0.158 12.965 0.000 0.164 13.229 0.000 0.167 13.437 0.000
% nohschool 0.381 9.771 0.000 0.453 11.834 0.000 0.466 12.815 0.000
borr. income -0.056 -5.476 0.000 -0.0475 -4.616 0.000 -0.045 -4.427 0.000
slag lowcred -0.096 -1.263 0.207 -0.083 -1.091 0.275 -0.120 -1.564 0.118
slag afamerican -0.277 -1.295 0.195 -0.018 -1.090 0.275 -0.009 -0.406 0.684
slag nohschool -0.249 -4.114 0.000 -0.214 -3.467 0.001 -0.198 -3.218 0.001
slag borr. income -0.001 -1.154 0.248 -0.003 -0.404 0.687 -0.007 -0.981 0.326
slag y<z 0.281 7.296 0.000 0.284 7.389 0.000 0.309 8.247 0.000
slag yz 0.487 9.723 0.000 0.472 7.547 0.000 0.567 4.346 0.000
 slag y -0.201 -5.338 -0.188 -3.597 -0.256 -2.053
R2 0.862 0.857 0.856
2 0.0057 0.0059 0.0059
tracts 422
years (xed eects) 3
2
0Table 3: Two-Regime Spatial Durbin Models for Various Poverty Thresholds - Renance and Home Im-
provement Only
Dependent variable y: Non-depository high cost lending rate
Poverty threshold (z)
% poor population in tract 20% 30% 40%
Variable Coecient t-stat z-prob Coecient t-stat z-prob Coecient t-stat z-prob
cp dummy 0.215 2.290 0.022 -0.010 -0.917 0.359 -0.023 -1.131 0.258
% lowcred 0.286 7.609 0.000 0.281 4.962 0.000 0.277 7.310 0.000
% afamerican 0.135 10.752 0.000 0.279 7.346 0.000 0.143 11.357 0.000
% nohschool 0.292 7.042 0.000 0.366 9.085 0.000 0.366 9.505 0.000
borr. income -0.042 -4.124 0.000 -0.035 -3.475 0.001 -0.035 -3.498 0.000
slag lowcred 0.172 2.182 0.029 0.185 2.341 0.019 0.167 2.130 0.033
slag afamerican -0.033 -1.500 0.133 -0.027 -1.212 0.226 -0.021 -0.949 0.343
slag nohschool -0.234 -3.723 0.000 -0.213 -3.357 0.001 -0.206 -3.260 0.001
slag borr. income 0.004 0.512 0.609 0.010 1.339 0.181 0.009 0.199 0.230
slag y<z 0.105 2.359 0.018 0.108 2.431 0.015 0.121 2.749 0.006
slag yz 0.277 4.360 0.000 0.267 3.330 0.001 0.490 2.696 0.007
 slag y -0.172 -3.172 -0.159 -2.206 -0.369 -2.068
R2 0.780 0.776 0.776
2 0.0057 0.0058 0.0058
tracts 408
years (xed eects) 3
2
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